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TORQUEMADA AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
COMPENSATION APPEALS 
William W. Milligan 
A history filled with terror, violence, and arbitrariness has 
tainted the regard thatAnglo-Americanjurisprudence gives to 
the inquisitorial system, upon which the terrifying image of 
Torquemada, Grand Inquisitor of Spain, has left its mark. Our 
memory of many such inquisitions contains historical episodes 
of biased examiners who elicited "the truth" ofreligious doctrinal 
inertia, leading to witch-burnings and stunting the growth of 
science. Our conscience retrieves these recurring themes in 
literature and the media. 
We hope, then, that in our modern democratic societies, we 
have left the old practices in the past. We no longer condone 
the secret hearings, the confessions and testimony extracted 
by torture, and the public burning of convicts and people found 
to be witches at the stake. Despite the discard of these harsh 
practices, the inquisition as a style of eliciting the truth has 
retained its dark images. Society attaches to the word "inqui-
sition" connotations of witch hunts designed to discover the 
rampant work of Satan in early Salem, Massachusetts, and 
connotations of McCarthyism with its goal of uncovering the 
work of communists in our midst. 
So deeply imbedded in our psyche are the negative connota-
tions of inquisition that the view appears in our jurisprudence. 
Courts will often term disapproved methods of inquiry as 
"Inquisitorial,'' when they mean to condemn violations of due 
process, "manifestly unjust methods,'' and coercive questioning. 
In other contexts, however, the word does not vitiate such 
concerns. "Inquisitorial" is not a negative when used in com-
parison to "adversarial." In other words, the courts do not view 
the inquisitorial style of fact-finding as per se unconstitutional, 
so long as such a hearing meets basic requirements of due 
process. 
In fact, we have many inquisitorial proceedings in our system 
today, such as arbitrators, coroners' inquests, summary courts 
material, Congressional hearings many administrative hearings, 
and institutional hearings such as those held by universities. 
This Abstract and the Article which will follow focus on the Ohio 
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review as an example 
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of an inquisitorial proceeding. We would not immediately dismiss 
these hearings as barbaric tools of terror. 
The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review shares 
common factors with inquisitorial hearings. The directions of 
the hearings vis-a-vis questioning of witnesses, is controlled by 
the hearing officer rather than by the parties. The issues already 
are defined by statute rather than by the pleadings. Statutes 
provide the Board of Review with investigative authority. There 
is no burden of proof. The Board of Review has its own rules, 
but it is not bound by strict rules of civil procedure or by 
standard rules of evidence. There is no jury. 
Although Unemployment Compensation appeals are admin-
istrative hearings, the special circumstances of the large 
numbers of hearings that the system must bear will differentiate 
them. When an administrative system need only conduct 
relatively few hearings, e.g., the Public Utilities Commission, 
it may devote more resources to the inquest. The hearing 
examiner may apply rules of procedure and evidence. Parties 
may have representation by counsel and procure discovery. Such 
hearings are more adversarial and begin to resemble traditional 
court proceedings. When the administrative system is burdened 
by a heavy volume of hearings, however, the process becomes 
more inquisitorial, driven by the constraints of time and scarce 
resources. Ohio's hearing officers last year heard 20,419 appeals, 
which typically lasted no more than forty-five minutes each. 
Yet, the inquisitorial structure still has redeeming values. 
Its evident durability, growing from the Justinian Code of 
Roman Law, has become the basis for the legal systems of 
Continental Europe and Latin America. The especially well-
developed European inquisition has brought meticulous in-
vestigatory methods, careful scrutiny of testimony, strict 
standards of evidence and investigation, and magistrates who 
control the detailed investigatory procedures throughout the 
entire hearing. 
American courts have indicated that inquisitorial procedures 
are not in themselves unconstitutional of unfair, so long as they 
meet due process requirements. The question, then, is how to 
define due process. Traditional methods of defining the term 
include a right to cross-examine witnesses and a right to 
adequate counsel. This definition does not apply to an 
administrative hearing, however, because the definers have 
assumed an adversarial system. The intent of the right to cross-
examination in an adversarial system is to ensure that opposing 
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sides have the opportunity to elicit the truth from what is 
presented to the record. In an examination, it is possible that 
neither side has representation competent enough to make an 
effective cross-examination of the evidence. In such a case, the 
hearing officer must take the place of the counsel in examining 
the evidence. The officer's dilemma is maintaining impartiality, 
while making an effective examination. Without this impartiali-
ty, the procedure is in danger of being a sham. 
The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review maintains 
an informal proceeding. A recent survey indicated that parties 
had representation by counsel in only twenty-six percent of 
cases. This informality presents a challenge to a system that 
needs to ensure due process. A trial judge is bound by rules of 
evidence and procedure, whereas a hearing officer is not. The 
hearing officer is bound only by discretion, and therein lies a 
danger of arbitrariness. 
The Supreme Court has analyzed the question of due process 
in several approaches. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 1 the Court describes 
minimal procedural safeguards: the opportunity to be heard at 
a meaningful time and manner, timely and adequate notice, oral 
presentation of evidence and argument, well stated reasons for 
decisions based upon the record, and an impartial decision 
maker. The Court in Mathews v. Eldridge2 adopted a balancing 
test, balancing the affected private interests, the government 
interests, and the risk of erroneous deprivation of private 
interests against the probable value of substitute procedural 
safeguards. 
The requirement of due process remains critical in both the 
adversarial and the inquisitorial systems, but the methods of 
achieving it differ. In an examination, where the parties might 
not have adequate representation, a hearing officer, unlike a 
judge presiding over an adversarial process, has a duty to 
conduct the hearin~ in the manner that counsel would have 
used. The hearing officer has the duty to delineate the issues, 
to present factual contentions in an orderly manner, to conduct 
effective interrogation of witnesses, and to safeguard the rights 
of the parties. The failure to recognize this distinction between 
a traditional trial proceeding and an examination limits the 
hearing officer to following the example of the adversarial trial 
court, which has been the bias of our jurisprudence. In order 
1. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
2. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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to insure the legitimacy of the administrative hearing, we should 
conduct first class examination rather than second class trials. 
